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in Present Value Calculations 
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This paper describes how the discount rate used in present value calculations expresses the preference for 
sustainability in decision making, and its implication for sustainable economic growth. In essence, the 
lower the discount rate, the greater the regard for the future, and the more likely we choose behaviors that 
lead to long-term sustainability. The theoretical framework combines behavioral economics and 
holonomics, which involve limitations of regard for the future due to constraints on processing uncertainty. 
An alternative formulation for present value calculations, which includes a survival function, is developed. 
A taxonomy of institutions based on discount rate is proposed. 
INTRODUCTION 
 The objective of this paper is to demonstrate how the discount rate used in present value calculations 
expresses the preference for sustainability in decision making, and its implication for sustainable economic 
growth. In essence, the lower the discount rate, the greater the regard for the future, and the more likely we 
choose behaviors that lead to long-term sustainability. The theoretical framework combines behavioral 
economics and holonomics. Sustainability describes a feedback mechanism between resources and 
behavior that is stable and enduring. Without those two characteristics, an economy (or ecosystem) would 
either collapse before our eyes, or at best change so dramatically that it is as if we no longer lived in the 
same world. The resources available underlie which behaviors are feasible.  Behaviors influence what 
resources will be available. From an economic viewpoint, behavior is an expression of the decisions and 
choices we make. Behavior is understood as the outcome of preferences given the 
constraints/opportunities/feasible alternatives faced. However, the resources available also influence how 
we make decisions. This includes not only our capacity to make decisions (such as information and 
information technology available) but also our being as decision makers. Since sustainability has a 
similarity to survival processes based on allocation of resources, a preference for it can be expressed by a 
utility function with survival time as one of its arguments. It also shows up in the intertemporal discounting 
and time horizons used in cost-benefit analysis. 
Some economists argue against using discount rates below market interest rates. Podenza (2011) wrote 
that, 
“A good case can be made that market rates used to settle private financial matters already 
incorporate intergenerational welfare considerations through the inherent, multi-generational perspective 
of the human family … this justifies extending the revealed-preference approach to discounting to matters 
in the public realm as well.” 
However, the revealed-preference approach is limited by the alternatives available. It also implies that the 
discount rate should vary as interest rates do. This is problematic since one would have to both forecast 
future interest rates, as well as deal with a plan that is not self-consistent. If the time preferences of 
consumers influence interest rates, then the intertemporal discount rates policy makers use will also affect 
future interest rates. Furthermore, when individuals have greater wealth and/or working capital, their time 
horizons increase. Rachid Laajaj (2012) demonstrated this when studying the impact of small investments 
on the planning time horizons of farming households in Mozambique. Also of importance, Borrisov and 
Dubey (2015) suggest that entities using lower discount rates will, over time, tend to accumulate more of 
the economic capital of an economy. Clearly, imagining the long-term benefits of a sustainable project must 
capture the essence of sustainability, which means using low enough discount rates, and a long enough time 
horizon, to even bother to be aware of those benefits. 
HOLONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
 While the term “holonomics” has been used for a while in mathematics and psychology, it is a 
relatively new term for discussing economic well-being. One conception of it is presented in the book 
Holonomics (Robinson and Robinson, 2014). Well-being is presented as an outgrowth of how we perceive 
the world. They suggest three major distinctions; mechanistic (objects), systems (relationships), and 
holonomic (meaning). The important contrast for them is that while traditional economics has profits as the 
goal of business activity, a holonomic approach has profits as a means to a greater good (similar to the 
Naïve/Sophisticated distinction discussed by Gigliotti (1988)). The framework we will use focuses on the 
nature of constraints and preferences. It is a recognition that our preferences over, and choices of, who we 
are being as decision makers deeply influence the commitments we keep, as well as what attracts our 
attention and shapes our priorities. These issues can be summed up in the catchphrase, “Coulda-Shoulda-
Woulda.”  
Of Constraints and Preferences 
 Maybe the most foundational concept in economics is feasibility. When we say an outcome is feasible, 
it means that outcome could actually happen. It “coulda” happened if only we had chosen to make it so.  
Economists tend to avoid considering policies or goals that are not feasible.  When one attempts to achieve 
something that is not feasible, there is both a failure to achieve that outcome, and depletion of the time, 
energy and other resources that might have been used to achieve another, more feasible, goal. Occasionally, 
attempting the infeasible means harm or death (like trying to fly off a mountain with no equipment or 
special gear).  Moreover, feasibility changes over time. When someone says, “I coulda” it means she could 
have done it then, and cannot do so now.  Feasibility is about the exogenous constraints we face in making 
choices. They are exogenous in that it is as if such a constraint was determined outside of ourselves.  When 
people say, “get real,” they are telling someone to recognize what is actually feasible.  
 When we say we “shoulda” done something, it means we could have benefitted from constraining our 
own behavior. If we had chosen differently, a better outcome might have occurred.  Should is about how 
we focus and limit ourselves. It is about acceptable outcomes.  These are a decision maker’s endogenous 
constraints.  However, it is a balancing act.  Typically, the benefits from endogenous constraints show up 
in the future. For example, becoming proficient at a sport, or playing music, requires practice. Sometimes 
people must constrain what they choose to do to assure that they get the time to practice. Exercising is 
another example. For many people exercising is not very enjoyable, and there are many other things they 
would rather do. However, by consistently exercising they expand what is feasible for them to do in the 
future (such as staying strong and healthy longer). The distinction between feasibility and acceptability is 
akin to the distinction between positive and normative economics often presented in introductory economic 
classes.   
 When we say we “woulda” done something, it means we would have done it if not for the constraints 
we faced. I would have visited Chicago, if I’d had the money; or I would have gone hiking, if my leg hadn’t 
been injured; or I would have gone out to the buffet, if I hadn’t been fasting. These are about external 
preferences. They are a statement about what I would have preferred to have, or do, if it had been feasible 
(coulda) and acceptable (shoulda). They summarize the goals, aspirations and priorities over outcomes 
about the world external to the decision maker. Such preferences describe what is desirable to the decision 
maker.  
  In contrast are internal preferences, which are over characteristics of the decision maker herself. 
They are about who we are as decision makers, and are expressed through the endogenous constraints and 
external preferences we use to make decisions.  If external preferences drive economic choice, internal 
preferences drive egonomic choice. They describe what is inspirable within us. This is the “Wasa” 
extension of  “Coulda-Shoulda-Woulda.” 
The preceding can be expressed mathematically as follows: 
B = Behavior 
R= Resources 
F = Feasible alternative set (exogenous constraints) 
A = Acceptable alternative set (endogenous constraints) 
E = External preferences  
I  = Internal preferences 
Letting U be the utility function over B given E, the decision process becomes, 
Max  U(B; E(I,R))   s.t.     B  ∈  F ∩ A(I,R)      
This provides us with a cute mnemonic; UBE  BeFAIR.  E can also be understood as a set of parameters 
that specify the external preferences. In the case of sustainability, we can also use the term well-being 
instead of utility, and we will represent that by W(B;E). 
 The holonomic framework we use recognizes that how we make decisions is part of the well being 
generated from decision making. In the case of intertemporal decision making, the sum of all weights into 
the future is a measure of the consideration one takes of the future. While the discount rate quantifies the 
external preference over future events, it also expresses something about who we are as decision makers. 
For some, sustainability is a moral issue, and is part of their endogenous constraints, of what they must do 
(e.g. “I always recycle”). For others, it is an ethical issue and derives from their internal preferences to be 
concerned, in a pragmatic way. Since sustainable outcomes require future decision makers to continue to 
choose with similar regard for the future (an issue of self-consistency in planning), part of setting the 
discount rate is based on whether resource usage and behavior maintain the long view. A robust plan would 
incorporate enough resources to sustain the psychological and spiritual requirements of decision makers to 
keep that view.  
 This framework allows us to consider economic activity as an outgrowth of the spirit (preferences), 
religion (establishment of endogenous constraints) and science (study of exogenous constraints) of the 
people of an economy, as well as their resources available. One could also relate this to the law: the spirit 
of the law, the letter of the law, and the long arm of the law. When seen in the light of the above, what we 
do in the economy, and even how we understand economics, is entangled with the scientific, the religious, 
and the spiritual. Economies do not just produce goods and services while making money. Economies 
produce people and ecologies that experience life, including spiritual expression, religious meaning, and 
scientific curiosity (read more on this in the appendix ). 
DISCOUNTING, TIME HORIZON AND PREFERENCE FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
 The discount rate and time horizon used in present value calculations are expressions of the preference 
for sustainability. Lower discount rates and longer time horizons can increase the calculated benefit from 
enduring farther into the future. As such, the propensity for sustainable outcomes is dependent on 
parameters that are set by the policymaker. Businesses, including corporations, as economic actors, also 
have preferences. Typically they are “for-profit”, and tend to use measures of profit as the utility function 
that quantifies their preferences.  How expected profits are estimated is, in essence, the spirit of a for-profit 
corporation.  The endogenous constraint that expected profits should be positive is, in essence, the morality 
of a for-profit corporation. This is in contrast with “for-survival” entities (like most humans) where 
retirement still has value, even if it decreases net worth. When faced with the question of sustainability, a 
traditional “for-profit” only considers duration to the extent that it increases that measure of profit. 
Likewise, sustainability tends to be conceived as a characteristic of the products they sell, or how they 
market their brand, rather than a priority to be expressed. Non-profits, not-for-profits and governmental 
agencies are more likely to consider the duration of an ecosystem, socioeconomic system or nation as part 
of their objectives, and not just a strategy or tactic.  
 To clarify the importance of the discount rate to implementing sustainable solutions, consider how 
economists model intertermporal decision making. The simplest version (Fisher, 1930) involves a two-
period model, using a utility function of the form  U(C0, C1)   =   U(C0)  +  wU(C1)                 (1) 
where C0 = consumption now,  C1 = consumption in the future, and w = the weight of future utility. 
Typically, it is assumed that w is between 0 and 1 to indicate that future consumption is considered, although 
not as important as consumption now. The solution suggests, w = (1/1+r) where r is the interest rate. More 
sophisticated models will have multiple discrete periods, or continuous time, using a different weight for 
each moment. Typically, such intertemporal models will assume a declining series of weights, to indicate 
the farther out into the future, the less of consideration by the decision maker. The sum of all these weights 
is a measure of the consideration of future consequences. To avoid confusion with the term used as a 
personality trait by Stratham et al. (1994), and for succinctness of exposition, we will use the term regard 
for the sum of these weights. In essence, one characteristic of the internal preference for sustainability is to 
have the greatest regard for the future, given the resources available to express regard. Mathematically, the 
definition will be Reg(T) =  ∑ wt    if discrete periods,   or   ∫ wt dt     if continuous time T0Tt=1 (2) 
where wt is the weight at time t, and T is the time horizon (the distance into the future considered). Note 
that in the two period model, regard would equal w and be less than 1. In the multi-period model, the sum 
of the weights can be more than 1.   
 In present value calculations, and many economic models, these weights are assumed to decline 
exponentially with a discount rate ρ. It provides a self-consistency described by Strotz (1956). 
Mathematically, we shall define this as Reg(ρ, T) =  ∑ exp(−ρt)   if discrete periods, or  ∫ exp(−ρt) dt   if continuous time T0Tt=1  (3) 
Thus, the greater the regard for the future, the more influential future outcomes are in decisions made today. 
 Because of its similarities to decay rates, one can also associate the discount rate with the half-life of 
weighting the future. This is the point where half of regard occurs before, and half after. Estimates of 
personal discount rates, such as Hausman (1979), suggest a rate of about 25%. That is a half-life of three 
years. Using the 10% discount rate mandated in 1981 by U.S. presidential executive order 12291 for cost-
benefit analysis back in the early 1980’s gives a half-life of seven years (about the length of a two-term 
presidency). Using the 2.5% rate of a recent mix of treasury bonds, gives a half-life of 28 years. It would 
require a discount rate of no more than 0.5% to express the intertemporal preferences of the “seventh 
generation” principle described by Lyons (1980), assuming a generation is about twenty years.  Even if the 
technology were immediately available, without the decision maker having a high regard for the future, the 
investments will not be made or maintained.  Only at very low discount rates would substantial regard 
toward intergenerational sustainability (i.e. 50 years or more) be expressed. This is graphically presented 
in Figure 1. The lightest shade represents a regard ≤ 5. Shades darken at intervals of 5.  
FIGURE 1 
 REGARD, BY TIME HORIZON AND DISCOUNT RATE 
BEHAVIORAL FRAMEWORK 
 The behavioral economic component of the paper concerns the finite capacity of decision makers to 
process uncertainty. Here it is formalized as a “certainty principle.”  This is represented mathematically as 
either: 
∑ wt ∗ σt   ≤  σc  or  ∫ wt ∗ σt  ∗ dt    ≤    σc        (4) 
where wt is the weight in decision making of an event at time t, σt is the uncertainty of an event at time t, 
and σc  is the capacity of the  decision maker to process all uncertainty.  In essence, uncertainty is a cost of 
considering an event. It also suggests an important distinction between emotional and rational decision 
making. Emotional decision making requires feelings as the processing medium, where w would represent 
the strength of feeling, and σc the available emotional resources to process it. Rational decision making is 
not constrained by the capacity to feel, but by the capacity to analyze. This shows up as the quantity and 
quality of data, uncertainty to the facts of the matter, and information technology. While the focus of this 
paper is setting discount rates and time horizons for cost-benefit analysis, the full human cost to choose and 
implement sustainable policies should not be ignored. 
 Assuming self-consistency, the weights will exponentially decline with time and are associated with 
a discount rate (Strotz, 1956). However, such perfect self-consistency would be limited by (4). It has been 
shown that under such constraints, the weights will decline until a point in time after which the weights fall 
to zero and stay at zero thereafter (Axelrod, 1990).  This leaves us with a special case for the continuous 
time model: 
∫ e−ρt ∗ σt ∗ dt𝑇𝑇0   ≤  σc (5) 
where T is the time horizon, after which the weights fall to zero. In essence, the decision maker eliminates 
more uncertainty by ignoring outcomes beyond the time horizon. Given an evolution of uncertainty (path 
of σt), it provides an interesting tradeoff.  As the discount rate is lowered, so is the maximum T available. 
The implication is that to induce lower discounting and extended time horizon, one must either decrease 
uncertainty through time, or increase the capacity to process uncertainty. Viewed in another way, given 
finite decision making resources, we either reduce our focus on the future, or we must censor the distant 
future out of consideration altogether.  
 The next step is to express the nature of uncertainty through time. A simple first approach is to assume 
uncertainty to grow exponentially through time.  This is similar to the propagation of waves. It also captures 
the notion that the farther we attempt to look into the future, the foggier it becomes. Letting σ0 be the 
uncertainty at t=0, we have the following: 
σt = σ0*eνt         (6) 
Substituting into (5): 
∫ e−ρt ∗ σ0 ∗ eνt ∗ dt𝑇𝑇0   ≤  σc  (7) 
∫ e(ν−ρ)t ∗ dt𝑇𝑇0   ≤  σc /σ0   =   N        (8) 
where  N = capacity of uncertainty in units of  uncertainty at time 0.  Continuing with the derivation, 
1(𝜈𝜈−𝜌𝜌) (e(ν−ρ)T  −  1)   ≤   N         (9) 
Internal preferences for sustainability suggest maximizing regard given decision making resources N. In 
the special case of an infinite time horizon, this implies using the minimum possible ρ that satisfies  
−𝟏𝟏(𝝂𝝂−𝝆𝝆)  ≤   N    →     ρ ≥ ν +  𝟏𝟏𝑵𝑵      (10) 
So, the minimum possible ρ is ν + 1/N. 
Let us now consider optimizing T if we specify ρ above this minimum. Solving (9) for T gives us, 
𝑇𝑇  ≤  1(𝜈𝜈 − 𝜌𝜌) ln(1 + (𝜈𝜈 − 𝜌𝜌) ∗ 𝑁𝑁),     𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜈𝜈 >  𝜌𝜌 
𝑇𝑇  ≤   N ,     𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜈𝜈 =  𝜌𝜌      (11) 
𝑇𝑇  ≤  1(𝜈𝜈 − 𝜌𝜌) ln(1 + (𝜈𝜈 − 𝜌𝜌) ∗ 𝑁𝑁),     𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜈𝜈 +  1𝑁𝑁 >  𝜌𝜌 >  𝜈𝜈 
This means that present value calculations that assume an infinite time horizon (for tractability), would use 
a discount rate of ν + 1/N.  In the other direction, when ρ = 0, the optimal T is   (1/ν)*ln(1 + νN).  This is 
displayed in Figure 2, where the areas below, and on, the solid line are attainable combinations of T and ρ 
given N. While the above is an oversimplified model of the nature of bounded rationality in decision 
making, it does capture some important insights.  First, there is a distinct tradeoff between how much we 
can weight the future in our plans, and how far into the future we are planning. Second, there is a tradeoff 
between using resources for making decisions, and using them for implementing them. We can increase 
our regard for the future, but it might be at the cost of fewer resources to express that regard. 
FIGURE 2 
  T-ρ FRONTIER UNDER FINITE DECISION MAKING 
The Myopic Trap 
  Since the uncertainty over the future is influenced by the choices made by those living in the present, 
there is a recursion. This leads to a potential “myopic trap,” a vicious cycle of increasing shortsightedness. 
In this situation an event occurs (either natural or anthropogenic) which decreases expectations or increases 
uncertainty about future well-being, leading to increased weighting toward the near term, and thus 
decreased investments toward the sustainability into the far term. This change reinforces behavior that 
makes the future less desirable to consider, thereby reinforcing an even more myopic view. For example, 
how we weight the future influences whether a clean water system is built. Whether that system is built 
influences how long a community will survive. The expectations of survival influence the uncertainty of 
the community’s future. The greater the uncertainty, the less the future is weighted, and the more myopic 
the decision making. This can be derived from the model above by noticing that if ν increases then either 
ρ increases, T decreases or both. Avoiding this trap requires valuing, even inspiring, the long-term view. 
This could necessitate investing resources to increase regard for the future. 
VALUING SUSTAINABILITY 
 One way to account for a preference for sustainability is to include a constant, which is not discounted, 
to each moment in the present value calculation. It is the value of survival, distinct from the net economic 
benefit. Another way is to further discount the net benefit by the survival probability of the system.  One 
example would be a well-being function of the form: W =  ∫(α +  πte−ρt)Stdt      (12)  = ∫ αStdt +  ∫ πte−ρtStdt      (13) 
  =  αET  +  PV(Sπ; ρ)      (14) 
where α  is the existential value of the system, πt is the net economic benefit at time t, and St probability of 
the system surviving through at least t. ET is the expected survival time of the system, Sπ is the stream of 
expected net benefit discounted by survival rates and PV is the present value of Sπ given discount rate ρ. 
In other words, well-being is the weighted sum of expected duration plus the survival-weighted economic 
present value. Setting the value for α is inherently subjective. One possibility is to use population. However, 
even if policy makers were to use some version of GDP or other measure of economic activity for α, this 
approach still includes a preference for sustainability in a more substantial way. 
 We continue our example by assuming a current lump sum investment Inv that generates a constant 
net benefit π(Inv). This is similar to buying a perpetual bond. This means that π0 = -Inv, and πt = π(Inv) for 
all t > 0. If the survival function is a simple exponential with hazard rate λ, also dependent on Inv, we derive 
the following: 
 W(Inv;  α, λ, ρ) = ∫ 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆(Inv)𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +  ∫ 𝜋𝜋(Inv)𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆(Inv)𝑡𝑡  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 – Inv                                     (15)                              = 𝛼𝛼
𝜆𝜆(Inv) + 𝜋𝜋(Inv)𝜌𝜌+𝜆𝜆(Inv) – Inv                                                                             (16) 
Note that the lower λ is, the higher probability of survival, and thus the greater expected duration. Again, 
this is a very simplified model, but it does capture a preference for sustainability through adding value for 
duration, and for reducing present value of economic benefit if it negatively affects the probability of 
survival.  
 As noted before, in the case of finite regard for the future, an infinite time horizon is associated with   
ρ = ν + 1/N.  What happens if the investment is not toward infrastructure or other tangible elements of the 
system, but rather toward regard for the future? In this case, N would be considered an increasing function 
of Inv, and we get ρ(Inv) = ν + 1/(N(Inv)). If regard increases with investment, then the discount rate falls 
as the investment in regard increases. Whether this increases well-being depends on how much transforming 
our economy to choose from deeper sustainable principles displaces resources for survival and economic 
benefit. In less technical terms, in a world with scarce resources, sustainability requires a balancing act of 
spiritual sustenance and material production. 
 
SUSTAINABILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL ECOLOGY 
 
 Another way to understand optimizing discount rates is to consider the distribution of discount rates 
used by various institutions. It is a taxonomy based on the discount rate ρ. For example, research on venture 
capital funds (Fuerst and Geiger, 2003) indicates discount rates in the 20-80% range. In contrast, the Inter-
American Development Bank (2016) uses a real discount rate of 12%, sometimes lower for very long-term 
projects. These discount rates account for both the rate of return and risks involved, from a profit-making 
perspective. On the other hand, institutions with sustainability missions have an inverted, although 
complementary, relationship with for-profits. Whereas the financial benefit in the future is equivalent to 
less today, due to interest income (if positive!), the benefit of sustainability increases with time.  This occurs 
for a couple of reasons. First, as population increases more people benefit in the future. It is reasonable to 
argue that discount rates be lowered by the population growth rate. Second, whereas for-profits are seeking 
to maximize profits per unit of time (for example a calendar quarter), sustainability is oriented to 
maximizing the amount of time for a given resource. It is as if the accumulation of memories makes the 
future even more valuable. Negative discount rates capture the enduring benefits of endeavors like 
education and research. With this in mind, Figure 3 suggests how the spectrum of institution types would 
fit on a continuum of discount rates. The horizontal line indicates weighting when the discount rate is zero. 
Downward sloping curves indicate a positive discount rate. Upward sloping curves indicate a negative 
discount rate.  A vertical line indicates an infinite discounting (whether positive or negative), which implies 
regard only for the immediate moment. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
 CONJECTURED SPECTRUM OF INSTITUTIONAL TYPES BY DISCOUNT RATE 
 
 
 
 From this perspective, another way to change the discount rate for the economy as a whole is to change 
the distribution of resources. If resources are distributed away from institutions with very high discount 
rates and toward those with low discount rates, then those resources are more likely to express the 
preference for sustainability. There are several approaches to consider. As Borrisov and Dubey (2015) have 
written about, free markets with liquid capital assets would naturally tend toward capital accumulation by 
entities with lower discount rates. What limit this approach are the frictions of actual markets, as well as 
their tendency toward capital monopolization (although it is these frictions which would limit this). A 
second approach is socialist/revolutionary where resources are forcibly redistributed. The obvious 
limitations here would be large transition costs, and social disruption, which could easily negate the 
potential benefits.  Another approach would be to view the discount rate spectrum similarly to the radio 
spectrum. There, radio and TV stations license bandwidth to channel their communications.  In a way, if 
money is speech, then the discount rate is the frequency on which it transmits. Institutions could then bid 
on the discount rate they will use for present value calculations in decision making. Subsidies could be 
provided for unused, or underused, discount rates. In a variant to this, one could imagine that entities 
identify and compete for market share on the basis of the declared discount rates, or regard, they use. While 
these last suggestions may seem wildly speculative, it is the intent of this paper to offer new approaches to 
consider how to express our preferences for sustainability, and to begin to address the distinction between 
buying the sustainable brand, and choosing from a sustainable spirit. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 How we rationalize discount rates in economic decision making says much about our priorities and 
limitations. From a behavioral perspective, it is the constraints over how much we can consider the future 
that limit our time horizons and discount rates. From a holonomic perspective, our internal preferences are 
the inspiration to value sustainable outcomes.  Managerial and policy implications include investing 
resources to maintain the regard for the future, while still incorporating profit/utility maximization as a 
tactic for behavioral determination, with appropriate endogenous constraints. This suggests that the most 
immediate and significant action to support sustainable outcomes is to lower the discount rate and/or 
increase time horizons used by governmental and large corporations, thereby increasing the value of the 
future as a resource. In essence, as long as the future is full of positive income, decreasing the discount rate 
has a positive wealth effect. This is also consistent with increasing long-term investments, and stimulating 
economic growth, and provides a counter-balance to the uncertainty the global economy faces. Beyond this, 
including a value for our economic and ecological systems existing (and not just the stream of profits), and 
accounting for survivability, will more accurately capture the benefits from increasing sustainability. 
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APPENDIX 
    
Science, Religion, and Spirit 
 
Science is the study of the observable universe. Physics, chemistry, biology, and other scientific disciplines, 
all have in common the accumulation of observations (“data”) as the basis for understanding how the world 
works. Theories are developed to explain how these observations fit together. However, theories are also 
expected to make predictions about what will happen. If new data is collected that contradicts these 
predictions, the theory is considered flawed, and work on a new theory begins. It is a never-ending process. 
As such, what makes scientific work practical is how it improves technology. Technologies, like wireless 
devices and computers, are what allow humans to build and produce as much as we do. Science is the basis 
for expanding our knowledge of what we can, and cannot, do. That which is scientific focuses on how we 
are constrained by the world around us. 
 In contrast, the religious focuses on constraining ourselves. The word religion comes from the Latin 
root that means, “to tie back.” Religion is the basis for knowing what we should, and should not, do. This 
can have substantial long term-benefits, as well as costs. Common among almost all religions is a calendar 
of important events. Nature religions tend to focus on change of seasons, and were essential for knowing 
when to plant, harvest, feast and prepare for the depths of winter. Whatever the deities worshipped and 
legends honored, it would have been a tremendous advantage to adhere to the behavioral cycles of the year. 
Other moral aspects, such as prohibitions against murder and theft, would have made it easier and more 
sustainable for people to live together in large communities. This expanded what they could do together, 
whether in dealing with the exigencies of the natural world, or in competition with other communities. On 
the flip side, such moral imperatives were often associated with punishment and ostracism. If these were 
too stringent, or the punishment too severe, it could actually decrease the coherence of society, as well as 
generating unnecessary suffering.  Moral superiority could mean having a better set of values (how one 
constrained oneself), or could mean having a greater authority to impose those values (how one constrained 
other people).  
 Spirit, as the animus with which we choose to behave, is the core of what we would, or would not, do.  
A kind spirit tends to express kindness in their actions, limited only by what is feasible. An “evil” spirit 
tends to harm, and cause pain, upon others, when they are unconstrained. A strong spirit has very distinct 
and compelling preferences. Indeed, much spiritual work requires one to imagine what one would do if one 
could do anything. This is very similar to discovering what your preferences are when you have no 
constraints. Part of a spiritual path is becoming clear about what your preferences are, and how you 
constrain yourself. The deepest spiritual work involves personal and universal identity, where the 
distinction between internal and external is questioned. The implications can be profound.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
